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29 October 1964

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State Department review completed



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
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*USSR: One result of the Soviet-Polish talks last week end may have been a decision to proceed with the mid-December Communist preparatory meeting in Moscow.

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The brief 25 October communique stated that Brezhnev, Kosygin, Gomulka, and Cyrankiewicz had reached "complete identity of views" on the further development of Soviet-Polish party and state relations.

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the Moscow meeting definitely will take place on 15 December as planned and that the Poles will attend.

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the purpose of the December meeting will be to "freeze" the Sino-Soviet conflict, not to push it to the limit. while this understanding was a great relief to the Poles, they recognize that the basic reasons underlying the conflict remain unchanged.

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These remarks suggest that the new Soviet leaders offered assurances that they would not use the December meeting to aggravate the split with China. They may also have shown willingness to modify the terms of the conference and to mute polemics. Khrushchev, while also disclaiming any intention to "ex-communicate" the Chinese, apparently intended to use this meeting to demonstrate that Peiping, by refusing to attend, had in effect excluded itself from the Communist community.

(continued)

The apparent decision to proceed with the December meeting reflects the new Soviet leaders' concern that if it were canceled or postponed the Chinese would exploit this as a major victory over the USSR.

Moscow faces delicate problems on the Chinese question in the current consultations with foreign Communist delegations. The Italian Communists reportedly will urge that the December meeting be postponed and that discussions be started on means of resolving the conflict with China. [redacted]

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Communist China: [redacted]

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[redacted] Peiping's next nuclear test is scheduled for March 1965 and will be "much larger" than the first explosion. /

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[redacted] In a joint communique Keita signed with the North Vietnamese in Hanoi on 22 October, he "warmly welcomed" the test and hailed it as a "great success." /

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[redacted] The Chinese may also be concerned over possible adverse effects of another test coming at about the same time as the second "Bandung" conference, scheduled for Algiers next spring. /

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[redacted] The prediction that the second test will be larger than the first suggests the Chinese are confident that they can improve the efficiency of their next test device, possibly by using both plutonium and U-235. It is believed that both of these will be available in sufficient quantity for a test by next March. / [redacted]

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Western Europe - UK: [The initial reactions in Western Europe to Britain's economic stabilization measures tend to be negative, despite recognition of the necessity for the action]

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[redacted] the import restrictions would complicate the Kennedy Round, and French Finance Minister Giscard d'Estaing observed that the measures "go in a different direction" from the effort to liberalize trade. [redacted] this move by the UK "seriously weakened" the EEC Commission's case for holding exceptions from tariff cuts to a minimum in forthcoming trade negotiations]

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[Resentment over the lack of prior consultation, which was widely noted in official and press comment, was to be expected, but nevertheless could serve to reinforce suspicions in Western Europe of Britain's intentions. Belgium's foreign commerce minister, for example, expressed regret at the "unilateral character" of the UK action and indicated pressures for EEC retaliation could be anticipated]

[Action by the EEC at this time seems doubtful. Any negative EEC attitudes, however, may become more evident when Britain applies to the International Monetary Fund for financial support. The EEC Monetary Committee will consult on the UK measures on 3 November and may press for closer multilateral scrutiny of British policies]

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NOTES

India: The Congress Working Committee, the top policy making body of the Congress Party, has reaffirmed the party's intention to keep India's nuclear program geared to peaceful purposes. The committee has commissioned Foreign Minister Singh, Defense Minister Chavan, and former defense minister Krishna Menon to draft a resolution on the subject for presentation to a larger party meeting next month. An influential minority in India, however, advocates going ahead with a weapons program, and even Chavan has expressed uneasiness over the use of such words as "never" and "forever" in a statement of India's intentions.

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France--MLF: [The French appear to be moving toward more active opposition to the multilateral nuclear force (MLF) and are evidently seeking ways of dissuading the West Germans from joining. During a conversation in Paris on 24 October, Couve de Murville told State Secretary Carstens the MLF would tend to limit cooperation under the French-German treaty and would isolate Germany from other European countries as well as France if it began as a bilateral US-German venture.]

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Gabon: [Earlier reports indicating that the French had decided to force unpopular President Mba to step down may have been premature. French officials in Paris evidently are concerned lest Mba's removal pave the way for a takeover by radical elements and have unfavorable repercussions among other former French African dependencies. News of Mba's sudden departure for Paris early this week has not yet been published in Gabon, but his departure appears to have become generally known.]

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

The United States Intelligence Board on 28 October 1964 approved the following national intelligence estimate:

NIE 29.1-64, "The Outlook for Greece" [redacted]

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Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
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The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
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